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APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF

I.

Statement Of The Case
Appellant Icirlc-Hughes Development, LLC ("I<HD" or "Appellant") brings this

appeal from the amended memorandum and opinion of the District Court for the County
of Kootenai. The District Court erroneously applied a legislative standard (even though
labeled by the court as an administrative standard) in finding that the Kootenai County
Board of County Commissioner's ("BOCC," "County" or "Respondents") first and
second decisions to deny KHD's Chateau de Loire Planned Unit Development ("PUD)
and Preliminary Subdivision Applications were not in excess of their statutory authority,
made upon unlawful procedure, and arbitrary and capricious as a matter of law.
Tlie BOCC, instead of fulfilling its administrative and quasi-judicial task to
adhere strictly to the standards for reviewing a PUD and subdivision application, as set
forth in the zoning code and subdivision regulations: (1) unlawfully utilized general goals
of the comprehensive plan to override the definitive standards of the zoning and
subdivision regulations, ignoring the reports and approval recommendations of the
Planning Staff and Hearing Examiner; (2) was equitably estopped by failing to abide by
its Post-Mediation Agreement reached during the appeal on the first hearing to restrict the
issues to be considered in its secoild hearing on the application; (3) violated substantive
due process by succumbing to political pressure from certain members of the community
who advocated opening the second hearing to a general attack on the compatibility of the
application with the surrounding area; (4) violated procedural due process in the conduct
of the hearing; and (5) abdicated its administrative responsibilities in favor of arbitrarily,
capriciously and unreasonably denying KHD's applications thus substantially infringing
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on KHD's statutory and constitutional rights as a landowner with a specific quasi-judicial
project application.
In evaluating specific PUD and preliminary subdivision developmental
applications from landowners, the BOCC acts in an administrative, quasi-judicial
capacity-not

in a legislative capacity as it does when adopting or amending zoning

ordinances or a comprehensive plan. The BOCC's only task is to determine whether an
applicant's proposal complies with the applicable zoning and subdivision regulations.
The BOCC does not have the discretion to take into account concerns with standards not
found in the zoning ordinance, including matters expressed by vocal members of the
community such as whether an area is suitable to any development where the zoning
ordinance determined that PUD development in the project's zoning district was
compatible in that area. The harmonization of a PUD development project with the
comprehensive plan took place at the legislative level when the BOCC adopted Kootenai
County's zoning ordinances approving PUDs within certain zoning districts as being
compatible with the goals enunciated by the County's comprehensive plan.
Here, the BOCC turned this on its head. Once the Neighbors for Responsible
Growth began putting political pressure on the BOCC, the BOCC abdicated its quasijudicial role and improperly returned to legislative decision making in finding that the
development was inappropriate for the area.' Despite recommendations for approval
from the Hearing Examiner and the County's Planning Staff, the BOCC denied KHD's
first and second applications for development. The BOCC found KHD's applications to
be incompatible with the surrounding neighborhood, even though this decision had
I

The Board stated that "the single most relevant question is whether this project is appropriate for the
location," ignoring the fact that the zoning allowed for more than twice as many residences to be built on
the land. (BOCC August 24,2006 Report, Record on First Appeal, 1971).
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already been made at the legislative level when the zoning ordinances were enacted.
Because KHD's applications were in conformity with the zoning ordinances, the BOCC
could not then re-visit the legislative question of whether the applications were
compatible with the surrounding area. The BOCC used the County's Comprehensive
Plan general policies as a weapon to attack KHD's proposal even though Idaho law is
clear that a local zoning board acting in an administrative capacity on a conditional use
permit, PUD or subdivision application cannot use the general terms of a comprehensive
plan in order to deny a developer's proposal that otherwise conforms with the
requirements of the zoning ordinances in place.
The decision of the District Court, approving the BOCC's rejections, is out of step
with Idaho case law and the case law of other jurisdictions around the nation. If the
BOCC's decision were allowed to stand, the substantive due process rights of all
landowners in Idaho concerning quasi-judicial administrative approvals would be
unconstitutionally infringed. Decisions on development applications would no longer be
governed by the definitive zoning but by subsequently applied vague and amorphous
standards that a county administrative body would be able to apply to applications on an
individual basis reflecting the political winds blowing on a given day.
Further, in this situation the BOCC was equitably estopped from raising new
concerns regarding ICHD's second application. After the BOCC rejected KHD's first
PUD application, KHD appealed to the District Court. While that appeal was pending,
KHD and the BOCC entered into mediation where KHD negotiated in good faith to limit
the issues in the second hearing in order to avoid further costly litigation. The outcome
was a Post-Mediation Agreement between KHD and the BOCC that set forth the
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roadmap for the BOCC to consider upon submission of a second application. KHD
suspended its appeal and incurred substantial expense to submit a second application in
accord with that roadmap. In submitting the second application, KHD accomplished
everything required by the County in the Post-Mediation Agreement, including:
KHD modified the conceptual PUD plan to incorporate the requirement for an
overpass of Highway 97 and received approval of all reviewing agencies
including the Idaho Department of Transportation (ITD);
I<HD updated the traffic impact studies to show that the effect of the development
would not exceed the capacity of Highway 97 including peak hours of travel,
which was approved by ITD and all reviewing agencies; and
KHD submitted a preliminary subdivision plat which incorporated all of these
changes. (Clerk's Record on Appeal ("Clerk's ROA"), 387-388.)
KHD voluntarily agreed to additional considerations after the Post-Mediation Agreement
was executed, and in reliance on the Post-Mediation Agreement, in order to further
mitigate the BOCC's concerns:
JSHD agreed to dedicate land and build a fire station on ihe dedicated land; and
KHD deleted a gasoline service station and retail to remove any non-residential
uses alleged to be incompatible with the area.
Although the Post-Mediation Agreement did not guarantee that KHD's second
application would be approved, the purpose and intent of the agreement was to work with
the BOCC to narrow the issues and address any of the BOCC's remaining concerns. The
obvious intent was to confine the issues on KHD's subsequent application to those
established in the Post-Mediation Agreement. KHD worked in good faith, incurring
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substantial expense, to fully implement the terms of the agreement. KHD, in good faith
reliance, mitigated all issues raised by the BOCC in its denial of KHD's first application
and the Post-Mediation Agreement. The County Planning Staffs subsequent Report of
August 23,2007 recommended approval of KHD's second application with standard
conditions. (County Planning Staff Report, Record on Second Appeal, 2065-2301).
At this point, local anti-development activists placed major pressure on the
BOCC. The BOCC breached the terms of the Post-Mediation Agreement, and denied
KHD's second application.
The BOCC was equitably estopped from going beyond the agreement terms of the
Post-Mediation Agreement in reviewing the second application. Nevertheless, in
disregard of its Planning Staff recommendation that ICHD had complied with all of the
conditions of the Post-Mediation Agreement, the BOCC impermissibly rejected KHD's
second application, citing as its findings KHD's failure to conform to five additional new
goals in the Comprehensive Plan. These new alleged non-compliance "deficiencies" with
KHD's application were not raised by the BOCC, the Planning Staff or at the hearing
held by the Hearing Examiner at the time the BOCC denied KHD's first application. Nor
did the BOCC or Planning Staff raise these new Comprehensive Plan goal "deficiencies"
when the parties entered into the Post-Mediation Agreement. The failure to raise these
new issues equitably estopped the BOCC from raising these alleged deficiencies upon
review of the second application. The District Court erroneously used a fraud standard
when analyzing estoppel, instead of the completely distinct nationally recognized
equitable estoppel doctrine in which a local government's affirmative actions cause a
landowner to incur substantial expense in reliance on the government's actions.
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In sum, the BOCC rejected KHD's first and second PUD and preliminary
subdivision applications on the pretext that they were not compliant with the general
goals of the Comprehensive Plan, despite the fact that the second application met all of
the requirements set forth in the first decision of the BOCC and the Post-Mediation
Agreement. This Court is tasked with reviewing the BOCC's decisions de novo without
giving weight to the decision of the District Court, as if the decisions of the BOCC were
directly appealed to this Court. KHD respectfully requests that the Court vacate the
decision of the District Court and remand with instructions that the BOCC approve
KI-ID'S Second PUD and subdivision application, upon the terms and conditions set forth
in the Hearing Examiner's Recommendation of Approval to the first application (March
2,2006 Hearing Examiner Report, Record on First Appeal, 1655) and the Planning
Staffs Recommendation of Approval of August 23,2007 on the second application
(County Planning Staff Report, Record on Second Appeal, 2065-2301), and award KHD
attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code 5 12-117.

11.
1)

Issues Presented
Did the District Court err as a matter of law in finding that the BOCC's denials of

KI-ID's Application for the Planned Unit Development Chateau de Loire on August 24,
2006 and the Application for the Planned Unit Development and Subdivision Plat on
December 20,2007 were not an unreasonable, capricious, arbitrary and discriminatory
denial of substantive due process by reason of:
a.

the findings of the BOCC were legislative in nature instead of quasi-

judicial, where the BOCC set forth new legislative standards for an administrative
approval that was outside of the standards set forth in the applicable zoning
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district provisions governing Planned Unit Development and subdivision
approvals;
b.

the findings of the BOCC were based on lack of compatibility with the

surrounding area despite the applicable zoning ordinance district provisions
establishing that Planned Unit Development and subdivision was declared
compatible with the area, resulting in an impermissible legislative rezoning of the
property; and
c.

the findings of the BOCC were based on lack of conformity with the

Comprehensive Plan in lieu of implementing the applicable zoning and
subdivision ordinance provisions establishing the entitlement for the Planned Unit
Development and subdivision approvals as being compatible with the area,
resulting in an impermissible rezoning of the property?

2)

Did the District Court err as a matter of law by failing to properly consider that

the BOCC was equitably estopped, in its review of the second applications for Planned
Unit Development and subdivision approval, froin raising issues that were not addressed
upon the denial of KHD's first application or in the written Post-Mediation Agreement
signed by the BOCC and KHD on January 19,2007?

3)

Did the District Court err in finding that the BOCC did not violate KHD's

procedural and substantive due process rights by the Board: (a) adopting a
Commissioner's individual unauthorized on-site " traffic study" of the property without
giving proper notice to Appellants or to the Board and subsequently advocating
opposition to and voting against the project, (b) incorporating the Commissioner's study
to resolve the issue of traffic capacity on Highway 97 to the substantial prejudice of
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Appellants and inconsistent with the Idaho Transportation Department's finding of
adequate capacity, and (c) being arbitrarily and capriciously swayed by public sentiment
and political pressure?
4)

Is KHD entitled to attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code 9 12-117 because the

BOCC, in rendering its decisions, acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law?

111.

Factual And Procedural History

Appellant Kirk-Hughes Development, LLC ("KHD") purchased a total of five
hundred seventy-eight (578) acres of land located on the eastern shore of Lake Coeur
d'Alene in 2004 and 2005. KHD's intent was to develop a private resort community
called Chateau de Loire, which was and is permissible under the zoning of the property.
The zoning of the land-which

remains in place today-authorizes

KHD to submit its

application for a planned unit development ("PUD") without having to request that the
area be rezoned. (Kootenai County's PUD ordinance provides that "[tlhe primary uses in
a PUD shall be those allowed or conditionally allowed in the applicable zoning district."
Kootenai County Code ("K.C.C.")

5 9-15-5.)

Approximately one hundred eighty-four (184) acres of KHD's land are zoned
"Restricted Residential" and another three hundred ninety-four (394) acres of the land are
zoned "Rural." (Record on Second Appeal, 162.) The minimum lot size in the Restricted
Residential zone is 8,250 square feet (or 5 lots per acre). K.C.C. 9 9-8-3. The minimum
lot size in the Rural zone is five (5) acres. K.C.C. 9 9-13-3. Kootenai County's zoning
ordinance regarding planned unit developments provides:
The overall density, or number of dwelling units in a PUD, shall conform
to the requirements of the zoning district in which the PUD is located,
however lot sizes may be varied. If a PUD is located in more than one
zoning district, the allowable density for the land in each zone shall be
calculated separately and then added together to yield the allowable
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF-Page 8
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density for the development. The distribution of dwellings within the
PUD shall not be affected by zoning district boundaries.
1C.C.C. 5 9-15-6. Thus, the total number of lots permitted by Kootenai County's zoning
ordinance on IWD's land is nine hundred ninety-nine (999). The number of units that
KHD applied for is four hundred seventy-five (475)-less

than half the number that KHD

is entitled to under the zoning ordinance.
In May of 2005, I(HD submitted its first application, which was designated as
PUD 054-05. IWD's plans met all planning and engineer infrastructure requirements for
fire and roads, for water and sewer and for open space. Public hearings were held before
the County Hearing Examiner, who recommended approval. (March 2,2006 Hearing
Examiner Report, Record on First Appeal, 1640-57.) Among other things, the Hearing
Examiner in his Conclusions of Law found:
"The proposed conceptual PUD is in compliance with the Kootenai County
Zoning Ordinance No. 348 Section 15.09C.. ."
0

"The proposed conceptual Planned Unit Development is compatible with the
goals and policies of the Comprehensive Plan as previously outlined in Section 5
of this report."
"The proposal is consistent with the intent and purpose of the Kootenai County
Zoning Ordinance. The benefits of the PUD justify the requested deviations from
normal zoning ordinance requirements."
"The proposed development is compatible with surrounding uses and natural
characteristics of the area. Areas not suited for development have been
incorporated into open space. Site disturbance will be minimized and will be
required to utilize best management practices to prevent soil erosion. Any site
constraints, hazards, or negative environmental, social or economic impacts will
be adequately mitigated."
"Services and facilities necessary to serve the development are feasible, available
and any adverse impact will be adequately mitigated."
"Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth in this
document, the Kootenai County Hearing Examiner hereby recommends that Case
No. PUD-54-05, a request by Kirk Hughes and Associates, be APPROVED with
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[standard] conditions. .." (March 2,2006 Hearing Examiner Report, Record on
First Appeal, 1655-56.)
As is routine with development applications, the Hearing Examiner recommended certain
conditions for approval-which

KHD agreed to undertake-such

as:

KEJD would financially participate in the Highway 97 Route Development Plan
planned by the Idaho Department of Transportation (ITD);
Any construction on lots with slope greater than 25% would need a site-specific
geotechnical engineering evaluation prior to approval of a building permit;
Wetlands disturbances must comply with Army Corps of Engineers requirements.
(March 2,2006 Hearing Examiner Report, Record on First Appeal, 1655-57.)
After the approval recommendation from the Hearing Examiner, the BOCC held
its public hearings. The heavily attended hearings2 were marked by hostile objections by
groups of organizations and citizens on matters that did not relate to any of the
administrative standards set forth in the County's zoning ordinance, but rather voiced
objections that no new growth be allowed in the area. (Transcript of July 13,2006
Proceedings, Record on First Appeal, Vol. 2). These objections were based on whether
any development should be allowed on the property, as if KHD's application hearing
involved a request for a Legislative discretionary rezoning.
Furthermore, one member of the BOCC, Chairman Currie, visited the site without
notice to--or authority from-the

BOCC or KHD and conducted his own "traffic study"

as an opponent to the application. At the hearing, Commissioner Currie stated:
Highway 97. Umm, I did my own traffic study. I took a drive out
there.. .I drove it twice. One very aggressively and I apology [sic] for that
and one very conservatively. I and - I had my stopwatch. I had to stop
once to let - when I was aggressive, obviously, to let some cars get ahead
of me so I could catch up again. But I also had to stop when I was driving
The BOCC Chairman opened the July 13,2006 proceedings noting the large number of people in
attendance, stating, "we do have a very, you can only wish the Seattle Mariners got this k i d of crowd."
(Transcript of July 13,2006 Proceedings, Record on First Appeal, 0206).
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conservatively. Obviously, there was people are [sic] driving more
conservatively than me. So I have major concerns urn with that. The
capacity of - of - of the road was stated by the Highway District that it
was not to capacity and it's, and it is not to capacity. But it's close. It is
darn close to capacity.. .Highway 97 is what it is. And it's not good.. .I
am going to jump back to IDT for a minute before I - before 1 complete
my comments. Um, I am not going to approve another development when
IDT says that um we will work this out later because IDT has some good
rules and I agree with most of their rules but the problem being is once we
approve it, then their rules change and we're left holding the bag and I'm
not going to have that happen again. So, ah, so if you haven't ah got my
drift, I am not going to support this development.
(Transcript of July 27,2006 Proceedings, Record on First Appeal, 0394 - 96 (emphasis
added).) Commissioner Currie did not abstain from the proceedings but vociferously
opposed the project and voted against it. The Board impermissibly decided to adopt
Commissioner Currie's study in place of the Idaho Transportation Department's study
that found that the development met all traffic requirements. The BOCC's denial stated:
The position of ITD was not supported by the public testimony or the
personal experiences of the BOCC. As a body the BOCC has almost onehundred and fifty years of experience living in Kootenai County. The
members have, over the years, traveled Highway 97 for personal as well as
professional reason [sic] both for the County and in private employment.
It has been their personal experience that Highway 97 in its present state is
not conducive to this increased level of development. (ROA, First Appeal,
1966).
The Board stated that "the single most relevant question is whether this project is
appropriate for the location," ignoring the fact that the zoning allowed for more than
twice as many residences to be built on the Iand. (BOCC August 24,2006 Report,
Record on First Appeal, 1971). The BOCC denied KHD's application on August 24,

KHD appealed the BOCC's decision to the District Court for the reasons stated
herein. During the appeal, the parties engaged in mediation to determine if the matters
could be resolved without continued litigation. Though KHD believed strongly in the
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merits of its appeal, it desired to forego litigation in order to get the development on track
and worked in good faith with the County to accomplish that goal. On January 19,2007,
the parties entered into a Post-Mediation Agreement setting forth the BOCC's remaining
concerns and offering a roadmap by which KHD could obtain approval at the conceptual
stage. (Clerks' ROA, 387-388.) Pursuant to law, the Post-Mediation Agreement did not
require the BOCC to approve KHD's second application, but the expressed intent was to
narrow the issues that could be raised by the BOCC at the second hearing. KHD agreed
to do the following:
Modie the conceptual PUD plan to incorporate the requirement for an overpass
of Highway 97, which subsequently received approval of all reviewing agencies
including the Idaho Department of Transportation (ITD);
Update the traffic impact studies to show that the effect of the development would
not exceed the capacity of Highway 97 including peak hours of travel, which was
approved by ITD and all reviewing agencies;

Submit a preliminary subdivision plat which incorporated all of these changes.
(Clerks' ROA, 387-388.)
KHD voluntarily agreed to additional considerations to the County after the PostMediation Agreement was executed in order to further mitigate the BOCC's concerns:
KHD agreed to dedicate land and build a fire station on the dedicated land; and
KHD deleted a gasoline service station and retail to remove any non-residential
uses alleged to be incompatible with the area. (ROA, Second Appeal, 1716-1718,
2504-2506.)
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KHD made the requested changes over the next few months, incurring substantial
expense, and filed an amended PUD application and Preliminary Subdivision Application
on March 14,2007. The second application, designated PUD 057-07, was substantially
the same as the previous application, other than fulfilling the requirements and
modifications that were agreed to by the parties in the Post-Mediation Agreement.
The County's Planning Staff Report of August 23,2007 recommended approval
with standard conditions. (County Planning Staff Report, Record on Second Appeal,
2065-2301). Among other things, the Planning Staff Report found:
"Based on zoning designations, the maximum potential number of residential lots
for this site is approximately 1050 lots.. .[I]t should be noted that.. ..the proposal
has reduced the maximum potential density to less than half of the potentially
allowable dwelling units."
"Currently, there is a mixed pattern of development in the area, including both
sparsely developed rural areas as well as a large scale project that shares many of
the same attributes as this proposal."
"The proposal is compatible with the goals, policies and future land map of the
Kootenai County ComprehensivePlan."
"The proposal is consistent with the intent and purpose of this Title. The
amenities, design, and benefits of the PUD justify any requested deviation from
the normal requirements of this Title. Development of the PUD is in the best
interest of the public."
A public hearing was held before a newly appointed Hearing Examiner on August
29,2007 and before the BOCC on December 6,2007. The hearings were marked by the
same objections about whether new residential development was appropriate for the area
and compatible with its natural characteristics. One nearby resident had concerns over
the types of people who would reside in or visit the site, noting "parlicular concerns about
the amount of drinking, and the police disturbances that arise from that.. ." (Clerk's
ROA, 561). There was concern that the development was allegedly a known
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archaeological sensitive area, but the County Planner admitted that the County had "no
data." (Clerk's ROA, 557). Another resident representing a nearby Homeowners'
Association in opposition to the project "stated that their concerns focused on safety on
Highway 97, which cannot handle more traffic because of the grade.. ." despite the
findings of ITD otherwise. (Clerk's ROA, 561.) A representative of another
Homeowner's Association testified in opposition because in the area, "the norm is
development on 10+ acre lots." (Clerk's ROA, 562). A representative from the Kootenai
Environmental Alliance "identified concerns related to traffic on Highway 97.. .[and] the
incompatibility of the design with the area (noting that the proposed density far exceeds
the density of the surrounding areas.. .)." (Clerk's ROA, 562). Many of the
approximately 100 people present in opposition to the project submitted forms indicating
their opposition, but chose not to testify.
BOCC Chairman Cwrie also raised the same concerns about Highway 97's
capacity that had already been rejected by ITD ("1 have major concerns with Highway
97.. .and what happens to 97 in the Eutwe.. .if everybody from the east side of the lake
came in today and wanted a building permit.. .that road just can't handle it.. .what do we
tell those people down the line uh when the road does not handle it that could have gotten
a building permit today.") (Clerk's ROA, 549).
Gary Young, former Kootenai County Hearing Examiner, responded to each of
these concerns on behalf of KHD. (Clerk's ROA, 563-564). He noted that KHD's relied
on ITD's traffic engineers with regard to all concerns about the highway, that ITD's
study indicated that traffic capacity on Highway 97 will be only 80% of capacity in 2022,
and that KHD had indicated its willingness to financially participate in a study to identify
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improvements and upgrades for the highway. Mr. Young testified that the project had
undergone a thorough Comprehensive Plan analysis, and that the plan was not regulatory,
unlike the zoning ordinance which regulates development. He noted that KHD had
addressed concerns related to wetlands mitigation, wastewater treatment, emergency
services, water supply, and slopes on the property. (Clerk's ROA, 563-564).
But given the vocal opposition from the anti-development locals, the elected
commissioners were determined to deny the project. The evidence reveals that the
BOCC was swayed by the large numbers of the public who attended the hearings and
requested that the applications be denied on the basis that the use was not compatible
with the area, regardless ofthe zoning on the property. The brief filed by the Intervenors
(among the more active anti-development area residents) makes clear that what the
neighbors really wanted was a downzoning of the property: "Residents and
environmental groups opposing developments in rural areas have been frustrated and
often thwarted with the great latitude given by the Idaho appellate courts in affirming
local government approval of developments disregarding overwhelming popular
opposition." (Brief on Second Appeal of Intervenors, p. 2, Clerk's ROA 956 (emphasis
added)).
Despite the approval recommendation from the Planning Staff, both the second
PUD application and Preliminary Subdivision Application were denied by the BOCC on
December 20,2007, based on alleged incompatibility with new Comprehensive Plan
goals that were not raised in the denial of KHD's first application or in the post mediation
agreement. The BOCC found that "[allthough the project was deemed to be a good
project it was determined that it was just not a good fit for the area." (Clerk's ROA,
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565). The BOCC found that "[tlhe purpose of [the property's Comprehensive Plan
designation] is to provide a 'country like' setting for residences," despite the fact that

KHD applied for residences at less than half the allowable density in the zoning
ordinance. (Clerk's ROA, 580).
The BOCC devised entirely new impermissible legislative standards by which it
chose to reject KHD's second application in order to appease the vocal anti-development
segment of the community. The BOCC's decision never discusses the original approval
recommendation from the Hearing Examiner or approval recommendation from the
Planning Staff. The BOCC's decision instead finds that the development was "not
compatible with the goals, policies and future land use map of the Kootenai County

Compvehensive Plan." (Clerk's ROA, 581). The BOCC concluded that "[tlhe proposed
development results in an overall higher density of development than is consistent with
surrounding land use," despite the fact that KHD's application requested less than half
the zoning ordinance's allowable density. (Clerk's ROA, 581). KHD has been left with
no choice but to assert its rights by a second appeal.

IV.

Standard Of Review For Administrative Decisions
On appeal from a decision of a district court, where the district court examines a

county board's administrative decision, the Supreme Court independently reviews the
BOCC's decision as if the case were directly appealed from the BOCC. Spencer v.

Kootenai County, 145 Idaho 448,452 (2008); Cowan v. Bd of Comm'rs of Fremont
County, 143 Idaho 501,508 (2006). The Supreme Court does "not give deference to the
district court's decision." Idaho Power Co. v. Idaho State Tax Com 'n, 141 Idaho 3 16,
321 (2005); HP Dunn & Son LP v. Teton County, 140 Idaho 808,810 (2004); Rincover v.

State, Dept. ofFinance, Securities Bureau, 132 Idaho 547,549 (1999) (a "de novo" or
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"standard of free review" applies). This Court is therefore tasked with reviewing the
BOCC's denials of KHD's first and second applications on a de novo basis.
The Idaho Administrative Procedures Act sets forth five separate circumstances
where the decision of a county board must be overturned when the decision prejudices
substantial rights of the appellant as follows: (a) when the decision is in violation of
constitutional or statutory provisions; (b) when the decision is in excess of the statutory
authority of the agency; (c) when the decision is made upon unlawful procedure; (d)
when the decision is not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or
(e) when the decision is arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. I.C. 5 67-5279(3)
(Idaho Administrative Procedures Act); Urrutia v. Blaine County, 134 Idaho 353, 357
(2000); Application ofHayden Penes Water Co., 111 Idaho 331 (1986); Bone v. City of

Lewiston, 107 Idaho 844 (1984); Fevguson v. Board of County Commissioners, 110 Idaho
626 (Idaho App. 1982); Crown Point Development, Inc. v. City of Sun Valley, 144 Idaho
72,75 (2007); Love v. Bd. ofcounty Commissioners ofBingham County, 108 Idaho 728
(1985) (the board of county commissioners' conclusion that a proposed change in zone
classification was in accordance with the intent and policy of the comprehensive plan of
the county was not a finding fact, but rather a conclusion of law that could be corrected
on judicial review). As set forth herein, each of these circumstances is present in the
BOCC's first and second decisions.

V.

The Lower Court's Decision Was Arbitrary, Capricious, And Discriminatory
As A Matter Of Law Because The Court Essentially Granted The BOCC
Legislative Discretionary Review Rather Than Administrative, QuasiJudicial Review
It is undisputed that the BOCC acts in a quasi-judicial capacity when it considers

whether to approve or deny applications for subdivisions and PUDs. "A decision by a
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zoning board applying general rules or specific policies to specific individuals, interests
or situations, are quasi-judicial in nature and subject to due process constraints."

Chambers v. Kootenai County Bd. ofComm'rs, 125 Idaho 115,118 (1994) (applying
zoning rules to specific applications is quasi-judicial); Cowan v. Bd of Comm 'rs of

Fremont County, 143 Idaho 501 (2006); Cooper v. Board ofcounty Comm'rs ofAda
County, 101 Idaho 407,411 (1980). Other jurisdictions also follow the same rule. Board
of County Corn 'rs ofBrevard County v. Snyder, 627 So.2d 469 (Fla. 1993); Neuberger v.
City ofportland, 603 P.2d 771 (Ore. 1979); Fasano v. Board of County Com 'rs of
Washington County, 507 P.2d 23 (Ore. 1973). Characterization of the PUD approval
process as quasi-judicial requires reviewing courts to scrutinize the merits of a grant or
denial more closely. See Ziegler, The Law of Zoning and Planning. §40:25, p. 40-59
(2005 ed.).
Neither the BOCC, nor any individual Commissioner, is allowed to advocate
approval or denial of the application. "When acting upon a quasi-judicial zoning matter
the governing board is neither a proponent nor an opponent of the proposal at issue, but
sits instead in the seat of a judge." Marcia I: Turner, LLC v. City of Twin Falls, 144
Idaho 203, 159 P. 3d 840, 846 (2007). "In this context, the Due Process Clause would
therefore apply to the zoning board in the same way that it applies to judges." Id.; See

also Richard Epstein, Coniston Corp. v. Village ofHofSnzan Hills: How to Make
Procedural Due Process Disappear, 74 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1689 (2007) (discussing how it is
a procedural due process violation to treat administrative actions requiring due process
protection as legislative actions that give the local agency unbridled discretion).
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A.

The Findings Of The BOCC Were Legislative In Nature Instead Of
Ouasi-Judicial And Effectively Acted As An Im~ermissibleLegislative
Rezoning Of The Propertv

This is not a scenario, as the District Court's decision implies, where the decision
should be left to the legislative judgment of the local agency, such as a zoning decision
where a legislative action is contemplated by the BOCC. On the contrary, here the
BOCC had previously made the zoning decision in its legislative capacity when it placed
the property in the Restricted Residential zone permitting five lots per acre, and the Rural
zone permitting one lot per five acres, allowing at least 999 residential homes on the
property. K.C.C. §§ 9-8-3,9-13-3. The BOCC now was left only with the quasi-judicial
task of approving applications of landowners whose applications were in conformity with
the zoning ordinance. See Floyd v. Klein, 765 N.E. 632,646 (Ind. App. 2002) ("[tshe
plan commission's only task when reviewing [a developer's] application.. .[is] to
determine whether the proposed plat complied with the concrete standards set out in the
subdivisions control ordinance..."). The BOCC has no discretion to deny applications
based on considerations other than the applicable zoning ordinance. Id. ("the Plan
Commission's denial of [the developer's] application on the basis of factors outside the
ordinance was erroneous"). The BOCC is not acting as a "mini-legislature" when it
reviews quasi-judicial development applications. Albuquerque Commons Partnership v.

City ofAlbuquerque, 184 P.3d 41 1,422 (N.M. 2008); see also Southern Cooperative
Development Fund v. Driggers, 696 F. 2d 1347, 1352 (1 lth Cir. 1983) (finding that since
the landowner had complied with the county's subdivision regulations, the county
commission had the administrative duty to approve the landowner's proposed plat and
their refusal to do so was a violation of the landowner's guarantee of due process).
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These requirements are in place so that uniform results are reached no matter who
applies to the local zoning board for developmental approval. "All persons similarly
situated should be able to obtain plat approval upon meeting uniform standards.
Otherwise the official approval of a plat application would depend upon the whim or
caprice of the public body involved." Bvoward County v. Narco Realty, 359 So.2d 509
(Fla.App.1978). A planning commission acting in its administrative capacity has no
discretion or choice but to approve a subdivision if it conforms to regulations adopted for
its guidance. Reed v. Planning and Zoning Commission of Town of Chester, 544 A.2d
1213 (Conn. 1988); PTL, LLC v. Chisago County Bd. of Com'rs, 656 N.W.2d 567 (Minn.
App. 2003) (a county board of commissioners lacks legal authority to deny a real estate
developer's application for approval of a preliminary plat, where plat proposed a
permitted use and complied with regulatory standards prescribed by that use).
When a subdivision ordinance specifies standards to which a proposed plat must
conform, it is arbitrary as a matter of law to deny approval of a plat which complies with
the subdivision ordinance. Ode11 v. City of Eagan, 348 N.W.2d 792 (Minn. App. 1984);

State ex rel Daniel D. Rappa, Inc. v. Buck, 275 A.2d 795 (Del. Super. 1971) (a county
council has no discretion but to approve a plan if the plan conforms to the subdivision
regulations); Sherman v. City of Colorado Springs Planning Commission, 680 P.2d 1302
(Colo. App. 1983) (where a proposed use was permitted, the city council exceeded its
jurisdiction when it rejected a development plan that complied with the zoning
provisions).
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B.

The BOCC's Findings Were Impermissibly Based On Alleged
Incompatibility With the Surrounding Area In Lieu Of The
Applicable Zoning Ordinance That Already Established
Compatibility

The BOCC's findings were based on compatibility with the surrounding area in
lieu of the applicable zoning ordinance provisions and standards already establishing the
entitlement for the Planned Unit Development and subdivision approvals as being
compatible with the area, resulting in an impermissible rezoning of the property. The
principal finding of the BOCC that KHD's project is incompatible with the surrounding
area effectively rezones the property, as the uses permitted by the zoning ordinance in
place are no longer permitted because they are allegedly incompatible. See Urrutia v.

Blaine County, 134 Idaho 353,357-358 (2000); Sanders Orchard v. Gem County ex rel.
Bd. of County Comm%s,137 Idaho 695,699 (2002).
In Connecticut, the designation of a particular use of property as a conditional use
establishes a presumption that such use does not adversely affect the zoning district and
precludes further inquiry into its effect on traffic, municipal services, or general
harmony of district. Havurah v. Zoning Bd. ofAppeals of Town ofNorfolk, 418 A.2d
82 (Conn. 1979); Sowin Associates v. Planning and Zoning Commission of Town of South

Windsor, 580 A.2d 91 (Conn. App. 1990); Lord Family of Windsor, LLC v. Planning and
Zoning Commission of Town of Windsor, 954 A.2d 831,837 (Conn. 2008); Pansy Road,
LLC v. Town Plan & Zoning Commission, 926 A.2d 1029 (Conn. 2007). In Sowin
Associates, because the land was located in a residential zone and the applicant's plan
was to use the property for residential purposes, the commission "could not weigh offsite
traffic concerns.. .or the general harmony of the district when deciding whether the
approve the plaintiffs subdivision application." The court specifically distinguished the
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situation where there was a pending development application from other cases involving
requests for rezoning where other factors such as harmony of the district and offsite
traffic considerations were permitted.
Other jurisdictions follow the same logic. See State ex rel. Schaefer v. Cleveland,

847 S.W.2d 867 (Mo. App. 1992) (a developer's plan may not be disapproved on grounds
of incompatibility with the neighborhood); Reynolds v. City Council of Longmont, 680
P.2d 1350 (Colo. App. 1984) (when subdivision plat satisfied zoning regulations,
governing body had no discretion to deny the plat); Smith v. Mobile, 374 So.2d 305 (Ala.

1979) (where planning comnission disapproved on grounds that it was out of character
with other lots in the area, the disapproval was improper); Pizzo Mantin Group v.

Township of Randolph, 645 A.2d 89 (N.J. 1994) (denial of preliminary plat can only be
based on standards in municipal subdivision ordinances and not on broad statutory

purposes).
Here, there is no request for rezoning. The zoning ordinance is already in place
and allows the PUD and subdivision that were applied for by KHD. Consideration of any
other factors was already made by ihe BOCC in their legislative capacity at the time
when the property was zoned. It is impermissible to reconsider these other factors at the
quasi-judicial stage where KHD's applications are exa~nined.~

If Kootenai County had desired to keep the area rural, this is something that could have been
accomplished by the County at the stage when the zoning ordinances were enacted-not after landowners
have incnrred expense and followed the zoning ordinances in order to develop their property. There are
resources that Kootenai County could have used in order to keep the rural character of the area. See
Randall Arendt, Rural by Design: Maintaining Small Town Character (Cambridge, Mass., Lincoln Land
Institute, American Planning Ass'n 1994).
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C.

The District Court Failed To Recognize That The BOCC's Denial
Based On Alleged Non-Conformance With The Comprehensive Plan
Is Not Permitted Under Idaho Law

In its denial of KHD's applications, the BOCC relied principally upon the
applications' alleged non-compliance with general goals laid out in Icootenai County's
Comprehensive PIan. The District Court approved the BOCC's methods. Doing so was
legal error.
A comprehensive plan does not serve the purpose of acting as a legal standard that
quasi-judicial development applications are analyzed against. The Comprehensive PIan
contains a list of general goals, which are too vague for a developer or a quasi-judicial
board to use in order to determine whether a particular application meets the express
written standards of the zoning and subdivision ordinance. The Hearing Examiner
reviewing KHD's first application recognized this, recommending approval of the
application because it met the requirements in the zoning ordinance; the Comprehensive
Plan was not the proper standard since the application was not requesting a change in
zoning. (ROA, First Appeal, 1655.) As detailed below, use of a comprehensive plan in
this manner effectively gives a reviewing board unbridled legislative discretion when
reviewing specific applications-a

situation that Idaho law, as well as land use law

around the nation, clearly does not permit.
It is well-established in Idaho that "a comprehensive plan does not operate as
legally controlling zoning law, but rather serves to guide and advise the governmental
agencies responsible for making zoning decisions." Urrutia v. Blaine County, 134 Idaho

353, 357-358 (2000); Giltner Dairy, LLC v. Jerome County, 145 Idaho 630 (2008); Evans
v. Teton County, 139 Idaho 71,76 (2003); Balser v. Kootenai County Bd. of Cornrn'rs,
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110 Idaho 37 (1986); Friends of Farm to Market v. Valley County, 137 Idaho 192,200
(2002). The governing board of a county cannot deny a use that is specifically permitted
by a zoning ordinance on the ground that such use would conflict with a generalized goal
of a comprehensive plan; a comprehensive plan reflects the desirable goals and
objectives, or desirable future situations for the land within a jurisdiction, but it does not
operate as a legally controlling zoning law. Sanders Orchard v. Gem County ex rel. Bd.

of County Comm'rs, 137 Idaho 695,699 (2002) ("[tlhe governing board cannot, however,
deny a use that is specifically permitted by the zoning ordinance on the ground that such
use would conflict with the comprehensive plan").

Urrutia v. Blaine County, 134 Idaho 353 (2000), is instructive here. In Urrutia,
this Co& held that the Blaine County Board of Commissioners' decision to deny a
developer's application "was improper in that the Board placed inappropriate emphasis
upon the subdivision's non-compliance with the Comprehensive Plan." Urrutia v. Blaine

County, 134 Idaho 353,356 (2000). Blaine County's ordinance, like Kootenai County's
ordinance, stated that the development application should conform to the goals and
policies of the comprehensive plan. In Urrutia, this Court held that:
It is to be expected that the land to be subdivided may not agree with all
provisions in the comprehensive plan, but a more specific analysis,
resulting in denial of a subdivision application based solely on noncompliance with the comprehensive plan elevates the plan to the level of
legally controlling zoning law. Such a result affords the Board
unbounded discretion in examining a subdivision application and allows
the Board to effectively re-zone land based on the general language in
the comprehensive plan. As indicated above, the comprehensive plan is
intended merely as a guideline whose primary use is in guiding zoning
decisions.

Urruria v. Blaine County, 134 Idaho 353,358-359 (2000) (emphasis added). This is
precisely the same legislative "unbounded discretion" with which the BOCC is acting in
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the instant case. This Court has already disapproved of a county commission's authority
to deny a developer's application based upon alleged non-compliance with the general
goals of the comprehensive plan.
Two years after Urrutia, this Court's decision in Sanders Orchard v. Gem County
was even more specific:
The Subdivision Ordinance's requirement that the Board consider the
'conformance of the subdivision with the Comprehensive Plan' does not
incorporate by reference all of the provisions of the Comprehensive Plan
into the Subdivision Ordinance...The governing board cannot [I deny a
use that is specifically permitted by the zoning ordinance on the ground
that such use would conflict with the comprehensive plan.

Sanders Orchard v. Gem County ex rel. Bd. of County Comm 'us, 137 Idaho 695,699
(2002). KHD's first and second applications comply with the zoning ordinance. The
Hearing Examiner and the staff of the Planning Department recognized this. The BOCC
impermissibly denied the first and second PUD and subdivision applications on the
ground that they allegedly conflicted with the Comprehensive Plan.
Since KHD was not requesting a change in zoning, using the Comprehensive Plan
was not the proper standard. In Pennsylvania, discretioilary uses are treated as
presumptively valid because the inclusion of such use in an ordinance establishes that the
proposed use is consistent with the comprehensive plan. Northampton Area School

Distvict v. East Allen Township Board of Supervisors, 824 A.2d 372,376 (Pa. Commw.),
appeal denied, 575 Pa. 689,834 A. 2d 1144 (Pa. 2003). A "conditional use must be
granted" unless the local board acting in its administrative capacity can establish that
there is a "high degree of probability of a substantial threat to the community." In re

Cutler G~oup,Inc., 880 A.2d 39,43 (Pa. Commw. 2005). Even when the local
ordinances require that the proposed use must be "suitable with respect to probable
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effects upon highway traffic," a local board cannot deny apermit because the proposed
use would exacerbate an already dangerous traffic condition. Id.
In Washington, the alleged noncompliance of a proposed preliminary plat with the
comprehensive plan does not support the denial of the application, since the
inconsistency between the zoning ordinance and comprehensive plan must be resolved by
application of the ordinance. Nagatani Bros., Inc. v. Skagit County Bd. of Com'rs, 739
P.2d 696 (Wash. 1987).
In Florida, the Eleventh Circuit found that the preamble to a county's subdivision
regulations, wherein the county reserved discretion to provide for the general health,
safety and welfare, but which contained no standard with respect to subdivision approval,
could not serve as an independent source of authority for the commission to disapprove
subdivision plat. Southern Cooperative Development Fund v. Driggers, 696 F.2d 1347
(I lth Cir. 1983). Because the landowner had complied with the subdivision regulations
in place at the time the application was filed, the county commission had administrative
duty to approve the plat, and its refusal to do so was a violation of landowners' guarantee
of due process. Id.
Here, the BOCC had impermissibly and legislatively changed the zoning on the
property after the quasi-judicial application had been submitted.
1.

The Goals Of A comprehensive Plan Are Not Intended To Be
Instructive To Landowners Developing Their Properties

The BOCC, on its second denial, added five new general comprehensive plan
goals not raised at the first hearing nor in the Post-Mediation Agreement. In the first
hearing the BOCC raised only incompatibility with Goals 7 and 14 of the Comprehensive
Plan, which were addressed in the Post-Mediation Agreement and were not to be further
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considered in the second hearing. Despite the Post-Mediation Agreement, the BOCC
found that KFID's proposed development was not consistent with Goals 4,7,9, 14, 17,23
and 24 of the Comprehensive Plan. Goal 4 is to "lplreserve, protect, and enhance the
water quality and quantity of lakes, streams, rivers and wetlands in Kootenai County."
Goal 7 is to "[plrevent or limit development activity in hazardous areas." Goal 9 is to
"[dlevelop land use regulations that protect property rights, maintain quality of life,
provide adequate land for development, buffer non-compatible land uses, and protect the
environment." Goal 14 is to "[plrovide for the efficient, safe, and cost-effective
movement of people and goods." Goal 17 is to "[elnsure efficient and effective police,
fire, and emergency services." Goal 23 is to "[dlevelop quality County parks, greenbelts,
and recreation facilities to meet the diverse needs of a growing population." Goal 24 is to
"[slecure waterfront and near-shore areas for beneficial public uses and enhance public
enjoyment of a growing population."
The BOCC's decision on KHD's application is precisely the situation that the

Urrutia and Sanders Orchard decisions sought to avoid. If the BOCC were allowed to
approve or reject KHD's PUD or subdivision applications based upon alleged general
violations of the goals of the Comprehensive Plan, the BOCC could consider public
opposition based on the general, vague goals contained in the Comprehensive Plan,
exactly what has occurred in this case. Meanwhile, landowners would be trapped in a
situation where they are offered no ascertainable standards nor guidance with respect to
the parameters to which their quasi-judicial development application should conform in
order to be approved; instead, each application would be left to the legislative whims of
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the BOCC depending on which way the political winds were blowing on that particular
day.
If the BOCC is concerned with implementing the goals of the Comprehensive
Plan, the proper procedure is to work in its legislative capacity to amend the county's
zoning ordinances to incorporate Comprehensive Plan goals into legally sound, specific
standards. Under Idaho law, and indeed the laws of nearly all jurisdictions, the BOCC
cannot use the general language of the Comprehensive Plan as a tool to deny individual
quasi-judicial applications that otherwise comply with the current standards of zoning
ordinances. The District Court thus erred when it approved the BOCC's use of the
general goals of the Comprehensive Plan as the sole basis for denying KHD's second
PUD and subdivision applications, and the primary basis for denial of the first PUD
application.
2.

Idaho Law Is Consisent With Sational Law Establishing That
Developers Are Entitled To I'nclcrstand What They Must Do
In Order To Obtain Quasi-Judicial Approval To Develoa
Their Land

"Developers are entitled to know with reasonable clarity what they must do under
state or local land use control laws to obtain the permits or approvals they seek."

Kosalka v. Town of Georgetown, 752 A.2d 183, 186 (Me. 2000); see also Ziegler, The
Law of Zoning and Planning. §40:25, p. 40-59 (2005 ed.) (the criteria must be objective);
South of Sunnyside Neighborhood League v. Board of Com'rs of Clackamas County, 569
P.2d 1063 (Ore. 1977). Zoning ordinances must be precise, definite and certain in
expression so as to enable both the landowner and municipality to act with assurance and
authority regarding local quasi-judicial land use decisions. Evansville Outdoor
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Advertising, Inc. v. Princeton (City) Plan Corn 'n, 849 N.E.2d 630 (Ind. App. 2006).~
"Zoning ordinances must be specific enough to limit arbitrary and discretionary
enforcement of the law." Cingular Wireless, LLC v. Thurston County, 129 P.3d 300,3 10
(Wash. App. 2006). "In the land use area, we look not only at the face of the ordinance
but also at how it applies to the person who has sought to comply with the ordinance
andlor who is alleged to have failed to comply." Id.
Here, there is nothing vague about Kootenai County's zoning ordinance and
density requirements-development of a PUD such as that contemplated by KWD's
applications is clearly permitted. But the manner in which the zoning ordinances were

applied by the BOCC in this case-particularly
comprehensive plan goals as a hurdle-lends

the use of the vague individual
absolutely no precision or clarity to the

process and leaves landowners with no definite guidelines to know how their property
can be developed. The use of the vague Comprehensive Plan goal standards by the
BOCC impermissibly leaves each individual application up to the whims of the BOCC.

D.

The District Court Failed To Give Proper Weight To The Hearing
Examiner's Recommendation For Approval

The District Court also failed to apply the proper weight that should have been
granted to the first Hearing Examiner's findings and recommendation for approval.
Where an agency's findings disagree with those of the hearing panel, the Court should
scrutinize the agency's findings more critically. Pearl v. Board ofProfessiona1

Discipline of Idaho State Bd. Of Medicine, 137 Idaho 107, 112 (2002).

A statute is unconstitutionally vague when its language does not convey sufficiently definite
warnings as to the proscribed conduct, and its language is such that men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning. Wyckoffv. Boardof Cozdnty Com'rs ofAda County, 101
Idaho 12, 13 (1980).
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The first Hearing Examiner examined ICEID'S application without influence from
the vocal segments of the community aid recommended approval. (March 2,2006
Hearing Examiner Report, Record on First Appeal, 1640-57.) The Hearing Examiner
found that KHD's proposed conceptual PUD was in compliance with the applicable
zoning ordinance, was consistent with the intent and purpose of the ICootenai County
Zoning Ordinance, and that the proposed development was consistent with surrounding
uses and natural characteristics of the area. In its opinion, the District Court never even
mentioned that the Hearing Examiner recommended approval of KHD's original PUD
application.

VI.

The District Court Failed To P r o ~ e r l yC:oiisider Or Applv Equitable
Estopl)el T o l'he BOCC's Actions At The Second Public Aearilig

The District Court's opinion failed to properly recognize that the BOCC was
equitably estopped in its decision on KHD's second applications for Planned Unit
Development and subdivision approval from raising issues that were not addressed upon
the denial of KHD's first application or in the Post-Mediation Agreement. The BOCC
cannot introduce new issues or standards with respect to whether KHD's second
application is in compliance with Comprehensive Plan goals. Upon KHD's first
application, the BOCC's decision stated that the application complied with all goals
except Nos. 7 and 14. The parties went through court-ordered mediation and entered into
a Post-Mediation Agreement setting forth the specific requirements of the BOCC in order
for the developmental application to be reviewed. The Post-Mediation Agreement forms
the basis for the principle of equitable estoppel against introducing new alleged
compliance deficiencies based on the five newly asserted Comprehensive Plan goals.
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In the Post-Mediation Agreement, the BOCC and KHD identified the specific
actions that IMD would take prior to its second development application.5 First, the
parties agreed that all proposed building sites would be in compliance with federal, state
and local laws and regulations, including those applicable to building on slopes. (Clerk's
ROA, 387.) Second, the parties agreed that any disturbance of wetlands would occur
only as permitted pursuant to federal, state and local regulations and permitting, including
those of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. (Clerk's ROA, 387.) Third, KHD agreed to
various actions to help mitigate the effects of the development on Highway 97, including:
(1) running construction traffic at non-peak hours as determined by the Idaho
Transportation Department ("ITD"), (2) constructing a permanent overpass/underpass
across Highway 97 to be approved by ITD, and (3) financially participating in studies of
traffic mitigation on Highway 97. (Clerk's ROA, 387-388.)
Despite these requirements being met by KHD, the BOCC introduced five new
goals of the Comprehensive Plan which it alleged the second application was
incompatible with. (Clerk's ROA, 581.) The BOCC cannot raise alleged deficiencies
that it agreed in the Post-Mediation Agreement would not be considered where the
applicant has relied upon in good faith by staying its appeal and incurring major
expenditures as it has done here. The doctrine of equitable estoppel prevents the County
from doing so.
In a case almost identical to the present situation, where the court remanded an
application back to the administrative agency for a second review, the agency was held to
The District Court noted during the February 22,2008 hearing that "[tlhere also was a second portion [of
the Post-Mediation Agreement] which made reference to Idaho Code 5 67-6519(4)(c) that provided
essentially that the parties agree to and hereby identify the actions that the Appellant, Kirk-Hughes
Development, can take to obtain permit approval of the PUD." Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings,
February 22,2008, Case No. CV-08-163.
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be estopped from raising new issues, objectives, and compatibility deficiencies. See

Floyd v. Klein, 765 N.E. 632,641 (Ind. App. 2002) ("[all1 of the asserted defects in a plat
must be identified at one time, and a plan commission may not raise asserted defects in a
piecemeal fashion").
Courts of other states have applied estoppel to new or amended regulations where
the applicant has made a substantial investment in good faith reliance on the ordinances
in place at the time of application. Henry & Murphy, Znc. v. Allenstown, 424 A.2d 1132

(N.H. 1980); American National Bankv. City of Chicago, 31 1 N.E.2d 325 (Ill. App.
1974). Idaho courts follow this line of thinking as well. Where a landowner, in reliance
on an existing zoning regulation, makes substantial expenditures before the zoning
regulation is changed, the landowner is protected from the local government's "everevolving" position. See Boise City v. Blasei; 98 Idaho 789,791 (1 977); City o f L e ~ ~ i s f o n

v. Bergamo, 119 Idaho 221,225 (Idaho App., 1991); Chisholm v. Twin Falls County, 139
Idaho 131, 134-135 (2003); Canal/Norcrest/Columbus Action Committee v. City ofBoise,
137 Idaho 377 (2002).
This is analogous to the situation where a county board cannot prevent a
landowner from receiving approval for an otherwise valid application by changing zoning
law after the application is submitted; a county board similarly cannot enter into a PostMediation Agreement spelling out the alleged deficiencies of an application only to deny
the application again after the alleged deficiencies have been resolved at substantial
expense to the landowner by asserting objections that were not raised upon the first
application's denial or in the Post-Mediation Agreement.
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A.

The District Court Erred As A Matter Of Law BYUsing. A Fraudulent
Esto~pelStandard Instead Of The Equitable Esto~pelStandard

The District Court erroneously used a fraudulent estoppel standard when
analyzing whether the BOCC was estopped from going beyond the alleged deficiencies
set out in the first application denial and subsequent Post-Mediation Agreement. (District
Court Amended Opinion at p. 24, Clerk's ROA, 1109.) Instead of relying on a fraudulent
estoppel standard that is based on a misrepresentation of fact, the District Court should
have looked at the established Idaho and national doctrine of equitable estoppel based on
the affirmative acts, words or deeds of a municipality. The Florida Supreme Court has
succinctly laid out the doctrine:
[Tlhe doctrine of equitable estoppel will preclude a municipality from
exercising its zoning power where a property owner (1) in good faith (2)
upon some act or omission of the government (3) has made such a
substantial change in position or has incurred such extensive obligations
and expenses that it would be highly inequitable and unjust to destroy the
right he acquired.

HollywoodBeach Hotel Co. v. City of Hollywood, 329 So.2d 10, 15 (Fla. 1976). The
doctrine of equitable estoppel is not based upon the necessity of a fraudulent
representation of fact by the municipality. "A court will preclude a municipality from
changing its regulations as they apply to a particular parcel of land when a property
owner in good faith, upon some act [I of the government, has made such a substantial
change in position or has incurred such extensive obligations and expenses that it would
be highly inequitable and unjust to destroy the right that he acquired." Florida

Companies v. Orange County, 41 1 So. 2d 1008, 1010 (Fla. App. 1982).
"Estoppel differs from vested rights in that estoppel is based on the representation
by government.. .and on the developer's good faith reliance upon that representation."
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James Kushner, 2 Subdivision Law and Growth Mgmt.

5 10:2 (2008).

As written by land

use expert David Heeter:
The defense of estoppel is derived from equity, but the defense of vested rights
reflects principles of common and constitutional law. Similarly, their elements
are different. Estoppel focuses upon whether it would be inequitable to allow the
government to repudiate its prior conduct; vested rights focuses upon whether the
owner acquired real property rights which cannot be taken away by governmental
regulation.
Heeter, Zoning Estoppel: Application of the Principles of Equitable Esloppel and Vested

Rights to Zoning Disputes, 1971 Urb. L. Ann. 63,64-65; see also Charles Siemon,
Wendy Larsen & Douglas Porter, Vested Rights-Balancing Public and Private

Development Expectations 49 (1982),
In Town ofLargo v. Imperial Homes, 309 So. 2d 571, 573 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1975), the court analyzed the equitable estoppel doctrine as follows:
[Tlhe theory of estoppel amounts to nothing more than an application of
the rules of fair play. One party will not be permitted to invite another
onto a welcome mat and then be permitted to snatch the mat away to the
detriment of the party induced or permitted to stand thereon. A citizen is
entitled to rely on the assurances and commitments of a zoning authority
and if he does, the zoning authority is bound by its representations,
whether they be in the form of words or deeds.. .
In the present situation, the BOCC entered into the Post-Mediation Agreement
knowing that KHD would suspend its appeal and incur substantial expense to implement
its terms. The BOCC is equitably estopped from denying KHD's application on any
basis other than those issues raised in the original denial of KHD's application or in the
post-mediation that resulted therefrom.
B.

The Post-.?ledintiorr Agreement \Vas Not .An Agrccnlcnt To Approve
The Proiect, But Narrowed The Issues Tlint Could Be Raised

The BOCC emphasized in its denial of KHD's second application-and
its filings with the District Court-that
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argued in

the Post-Mediation Agreement could not grant a

guarantee of approval in violation of the principles of contract zoning. KHD agrees. The
BOCC's argument misses the point. The purpose of the Post-Mediation Agreement was
to clarify the issues in KHD's development application that the BOCC believed were not
in compliance with the zoning ordinance so that these issues could he addressed by KHD
at the second hearing. The intent was to confine the issues to be raised upon KHD's
second application to those agreed to in the Post-Mediation Agreement.
This is not contract zoning. These types of agreements are routinely permitted.
See Castle Ifomes and Development, Inc. v. City of Brier, 882 P.2d 1172 (Wash. 1994)
(city entered into voluntary agreement so equitable estoppel applies); Batakis v. Town of
Belmont, 607 A.2d 956 (N.H. 1992) (notice from planning board stating that proposal
would be reviewed under site plan standards estopped the board from abruptly changing
its decision and applying alternative subdivision standards).
"Specific statements or representations, including agreements and informal
actions, of govermnent officials inducing a property owner to rely thereon and materially
change his position are sufficient government acts for the application of equitable
estoppel." Craig Janslow, Understanding the Doctrine of Equitable Estoppel in Florida,
38 U. Miami L. Rev. 187,211 (1984). Here, the BOCC and KHD negotiated and agreed
upon the issues that remained. The BOCC was authorized to enter into this agreement.
See Congregation Etz Chaim v. City ofLos Angeles, 371 F. 3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2004);
Monell v. Dept. ofsocial Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658,690-692 (1978).
Equitable estoppel prevents the BOCC from choosing not to honor the terms of its duly
authorized agreement.
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C.

KHD Relied U-pon The Countv's Action

The BOCC knew that KND would rely on the Post-Mediation Agreement as the
definitive roadmap towards approval of KHD's application. KHD spent substantial
amounts of time and expenditures over the next few months working to shape its second
PUD and first preliminary subdivision application so that the BOCC's concerns would be
adequately addressed. In fact, the County Planning Staff recommended approval of the
second applications based on compliance with all applicable issues raised in the first
hearing and the Post-Mediation Agreement. (ROA, Second Appeal, 2065-2301.) In
reliance on the BOCC's agreement, KHD also agreed to suspend its appeal of the
BOCC's denial of KHD's first application.
Equitable estoppel applies in situations where a local government makes a
representation, including agreements and other informal actions, that induce a property
owner to rely thereon and materially change his position. City of Naples v. Crans, 292
So.2d 58 (Fla. 2nd Dist. 1974); see also Killearn Properties, Inc. v. Cily of Tallahassee,
366 So.2d 172 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1979) (equitable estoppel can be invoked even without the
expenditure of a single dollar); Abbeville Arms v. City ofAbbeville, 257 S.E.2d 716 (N.C.
1979) (government was equitably estopped from denying permit where $100,000 was
spent in reliance on zoning compatibility based on defective zoning map); City of Berea

v. Wren, 818 S.W.2d 274 (Ky. Ct. App. 1991) (property owner in good faith relied upon
erroneously issued permit); Clackamas Counly v. Holmes, 508 P.2d 190 (Ore. 1973)
(relaxed substantial reliance test applying equitable factors); Janslow, 38 U. Miami L.
Rev. at 213 ("[algreements and oral contracts reached with local governments will also
suffice as government acts"). A developer must be able to rely on a local government's
statement of an application's deficiencies; the government cannot assert deficiencies on a
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piecemeal basis once the developer has relied on the government's position. Equicor

Development, Inc. v. Westfield-Waskington Tp. Plan Corn 'n,758 N.E.2d 34 (Ind. 2001)
(developer reasonably relied on the absence of parking problem that had never been
raised before the commission's vote on the application, so commission was estopped
from asserting this deficiency as a reason to deny approval); Harrison County v. Aulbach,
748 N.E.2d 926 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (commission may not impose condition where the
subject of the condition has not previously been addressed during 10-month application
consideration period); Floyd v. Klein, 765 N.E. 632,641 (Ind. App. 2002); Relay Imp.

Ass 'n v. Sycamore Realty Co., Inc., 661 A.2d 182 (Md. App. 1995).
The principle of governmental equitable estoppel is properly invoked here to
prohibit the BOCC from denying KHD's second application based upon new
Comprehensive Plan goals after KHD incurred substantial expense in reasonable and
good faith reliance on the Post-Mediation Agreement, which the parties intended to be a
roadmap toward project approval. "[Ilf a plan commission fails to apprise a developer of
asserted defects in a plat following a hearing, the commission may be estopped from
denying an application for plat approval on the basis of those asserted defects following a
subsequent hearing." Floyd v. Klein, 765 N.E. 632,641 (Ind. App. 2002). It is
inequitable to deprive KHD of the right to complete the development as proposed after
incurring expenses in reliance on the BOCC's execution of the Post-Mediation
Agreement.

D.

The BOCC Engaged in Unfair Dealings

"Unfair dealing by a municipality can also serve as the basis for the invokement
of equitable estoppel." Hollywood Beach Hotel Co. v. City ofIToIlywood, 329 So.2d 10,
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18 (Fla. 1976). Here, the BOCC unfairly dealt with the landowner as they entered into a
Post-Mediation Agreement, convinced the landowner to suspend its appeal of the
BOCC's original denial, asked the landowner to make substantial expenditures based on
the agreement, and then never gave the landowner a fair shake when it submitted its
second application.

VII.

KHD's Procedural And Substantive Due Process Rights Were Violated By
The BOCC; The District Court Erred As A Matter Of Law In Refusing To
Find Due Process Violations Where The BOCC's Actions Relied On An
Unsupported And Unrelated Political Outcry, Ex Parte Communications,
Unauthorized Site Visits And Personal Studies By BOCC Members
The BOCC's denial of KHD's applications must be reversed because the denials

were in total violation of KHD's entitlement to due process. "When acting upon a quasijudicial zoning matter the governing board is neither proponent nor an opponent of the
proposal at issue, but sits instead in the seat of the judge." Marcia I: Turner, LLC 17. City

of Twin Falls, 144 Idaho 203, 159 P. 3d 840, 846 (2007). "In this context, the Due
Process Clause would therefore apply to the zoning board in the same way that it applies
to judges." Id.
It is undisputed that the BOCC acts in a quasi-judicial and not legislative capacity
when it considers whether to approve or deny applications for subdivisions and PUDs.
"A decision by a zoning board applying general rules or specific policies to specific

individuals, interests, or situations, [is] quasi-judicial in nature and subject to due process
constraints." Chambers v. Kootenai County Bd Of Comm 'rs, 125 Idaho 115,118 (1994);

Cowan v. Bd Of Cornm 'rs of~remontCounty, 143 Idaho 501 (2006); Cooper v. Board of
County Comm'rs ofAda County; 101 Idaho 407,411 (1980).
As stated recently by the New Mexico Supreme Court in Albuquerque Commons

Partnership v. City of Council ofAlbuquerque, 144 P.3d at p. 421-422 (N.M., 2008):
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See 3 Edward H. Ziegler, Jr; Rathkopfs Law of Zoning and Planning,
$40:22 at 40-49 (2005) (noting that characterization as quasi-judicial can
result in the parties being entitled to greater procedural rights and enabling
reviewing courts to conduct a closer scrutiny of the merits of the decision).
Quasi-judicial zoning matters are not politics-as-usual as far as the
municipal governing body is concerned. In such proceedings, the council
does not sit as a mini-legislature, as it functions in most matters, but
instead must act like a judicial body bound by "ethical standards
comparable to those that govern a court in performing the same function."
High Ridge Hinkle Joint Venture v. City ofAlbuquerque, 888 P.2d 475,
486 (N.M.App.1994).

A,

Members Of The BOCC Are Not Authorized To Make Independent
Site Visits Nor To Advocate Denial Of The Application Based On
Their Own Personal Studies
1.

Impermissible Reliance On Personal Studies

It is an impermissible violation of due process rights for a member of the BOCC,
in stated opposition to the project, to view the property and the highway running through
the property, conducting "studies" on his own, without authority from the BOCC or
notice to KHD, the BOCC and the public. Comer v. County of Twin Falls, 130 Idaho
433,439 (1997) (the Board of County Commissioners, which was considering an
application, violated due process rights when they reviewed property in question without
notice and without giving parties or their representative opportunity to be present); See

. 1991)
also Nasierowski Bros. Inv. Co. v. City ofSterling Heights, 949 F.2d 890 (6th Cir.
and Harris v. County of Riverside, 904 F.2d 497, 501-02 (9" Cir. 1990) (both finding that
the procedural due process rights of the owners were violated where they were not given
notice in a quasi-judicial zoning proceeding).
Here, the Idaho Transportation Department determined that the KHD project was
well within the capacity of Highway 97 and had no objection to KHD moving to the next
stage in the process. By statute (I.C. $40-3 10 et seq.), ITD is given sole authority over
all decisions concerning congestion, adequacy, and safety on state highways.
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Even though preempted by statute, the BOCC elevated itself over the expertise of
ITD and relied on its own Board member, Elmer Currie's amateur "traffic studies" to
reach the pretextual conclusion that KHD's application does not comply with Goal No.
14. The BOCC's Order of Decision in its denial of KHD's first application makes clear
that the BOCC abandoned ITD's determination in favor of its ow11 ad hoc analysis:
The result of the constantly changing position of ITD was a significant
degradation of their credibility with the County on this PUD. The position
of ITD was not supported by the public testimony or the personal
experiences of the BOCC. As a body the BOCC has almost one-hundred
and fifty years of experience living in Kootenai County. The members
have, over the years, traveled Highway 97 for personal as well as
professional reasoil both for the County and in private employment. It has
been their personal experience that Highway 97 in its present state is not
conducive to this increased level of development.
(Findings of Board of Commissioners of Kootenai County, Order of Decision, PUD 05405, page 7, ROA.) Chairman Currie even related his own experiences in driving State
Highway 97 even though he is neither qualified to make these judgments, nor is there any
statute giving the BOCC the authority to take these findings into account. Doing so is a
violation of Idaho statutory law, providing that the approval or denial of an application
"shall be based upon standards and criteria which shall be set forth in the comprehensive
plan, zoning ordinance or other appropriate ordinance or regulation of the city or county."
I.C. § 67-6535.
The "personal studies" of the capacity of Highway 97 by Commissioner Currie,
without the presence of an ITD, BOCC or KHD representative were a gross breach of due
process. It was further aggravated because the "personal studies" were used by him to
personally advocate against and oppose the application and were in fact adopted by the
BOCC. (See Findings of BOCC on PUD 054-05, p. 7, ROA, First Appeal, 1966).
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Moreover, the question of adequacy of grades on a state highway are within the sole
authority of the ITD, which in fact advised the BOCC that the grades were acceptable and
that further details would be appropriate at later permitting. Thus, the BOCC reliance on
the "personal studies" opposing the project was error and went beyond the authority of
local government when acting in a quasi-judicial capacity. Interested parties in a quasijudicial land use approval proceeding are entitled to an opportunity to present and rebut
evidence to a tribunal which is impartial in the matter, i.e. having had no pre-hearing or
ex parte contacts concerning the question at issue. Albuquerque Commons Partnership v.

City Council of Albuquerque, 189 P.3d 41 1 at 423 (N.M. 2008).
Since the BOCC placed heavy reliance on the inadequacy of the grades of
Highway 97 based on ultra-vires and unethical studies by a board member, this must lead
to a vacation of the BOCC's determination.
2.

Im~ermissibleCommissioner Bias

The BOCC is not allowed to advocate approval or denial of the application
"When acting upon a quasi-judicial zoning matter the governing board is neither a
proponent nor an opponent of the proposal at issue, but sits instead in the seat of a judge."

Marcia T. Turner, LLC v. City ofTwin Falls, 144 Idaho 203, 159 P. 3d 840, 846, (2007).
"In this context, the Due Process clause would therefore apply to the zoning board in the
same way that it applies to judges." Id Due process in an administrative setting requires
that the hearing is conducted before an impartial, unbiased review panel; even a
probability of actual bias on the part of those with decision-making power is enough for
the Claimant to establish that there has been a due process violation. Nasha LLC v. City

ofLos Angeles, 22 Cal.Rptr.3d 772, 780 (Cal. App. 2004) (an article in a newsletter
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written by member of commission established a "probability of actual bias" giving rise to
a procedural due process violation).
Commissioner Currie was not an impartial arbiter here. Due process entitles an
applicant to an impartial and disinterested tribunal, including administrative proceedings.

Davisco Foods Int'l v. Gooding County, 141 Idaho 784,791 (2004). In Davisco, this
Court found that there was no evidence of bias because one of the commissioners came to
the hearing with an open mind. That is not the case here. Commissioner Cusrie
impermissibly advocated denial of KHD's applications from the filing of the first
application. See Place v. BoardofAdjustment, 200 A.2d 601 (N.J. 1964) (improper for
the mayor to appear before the board on behalf of a litigant); Montgomery County Bd of

Appeals v. Walker, 180 A.2d 865 (Md. 1962) (the board, like "Caesar's wife," should be
above suspicion); Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. v. Dallas County, 675 N.W.2d 544
(Iowa 2004); L.A. Ray Realty v. Town Council of Town of Cumberland, 698 A.2d 202
(R.I. 1997) (finding of official animus toward developer constituted a violation of
procedural due process).
B.

It Is A Violation Of Substantive Due Process For A Ouasi-Judicial
Body To Be Swayed By Public Sentiment And Political Pressure To
Deny The Applications Based On Ultra Vires Public Requests To
Change The Zoning Of The Site

Substantive due process is violated by a governmental body acting arbitrarily and
capriciously, umeasonably, for improper motives, and by improper means. This includes
acting on the basis of a change in political climate. Wheeler v. City of Pleasant Grove,
664 F.2d 99, 100 (5thCir. 1981); Brady v. Town of Colchester, 863 F.2d 205,216 (2d Cis.
1988) (cannot deny a permit based on "impermissible political animus"); L.A. Ray

Realty v. Town Council of Town of Cumberland, 698 A.2d 202 (R.I. 1997) (developers
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have a constitutionally protected property interest in subdivision approvals when they
have complied with all valid regulations); Hollywood Beach Hotel Co. v. City of

Hollywood, 329 So.2d 10, 16 (Fla. 1976) ("adverse political climate" is not a reason to
change zoning classification of the plaintiffs' property); Cine SK8, Inc. v. Town of

I-lenrietta, 507 F.3d. 778,786 (2nd Cir. 2007) (adverse political animus of even one
member of a board is enough to constitute a substantive due process violation).
The evidence here reveals that the BOCC was swayed by the large numbers of the
public who attended the hearings and requested that the applications be denied on the
basis that the use was not compatible with the area, regardless of the zoning on the
property. The New York Court of Appeals has opined on a similar case where an
applicant for a conditional use permit authorized for a shopping center by the zoning
ordinance was denied the permit because the public wanted the property downzoned to
residential. In finding the actions of the city arbitrary, capricious and discriminatory, the
Court voided the city's actions and ordered the issuance of the permit. Udell v. Haas,
235 N.E.2d 897,900 (N.Y. 1968):
[i]n exercising their zoning powers the local authorities must [not] act
because of the whims of either an articulate minority or even majority of
the community ... and ... ensure that the public welfare is being served
and that zoning does not become nothing more than a Gallup Poll.
If this were a legislative decision by the BOCC, listening to any objections by members
of the public may be appropriate. However, when the BOCC is acting in a quasi-judicial
capacity, public opinion on matters outside of the project's conformity with the zoning
ordinance is entirely irrelevant. See Albuquerque Commons Partnership at p. 422:
Quasi-judicial zoning matters are not politics-as-usual as far as the
municipal governing body is concerned. In such proceedings, the council
does not sit as a mini-legislature, as it functions in most matters, but
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instead must act like a judicial body bound by ethical standards
comparable to those that govern a court.. .
The BOCC abdicated its quasi-judicial role and succumbed to political pressure, resulting
in an impermissible violation of KHD's substantive due process rights.

VIII.

CONCLUSION
The District Court committed legal error by applying a legislative standard

instead of an administrative standard when analyzing the decision of the BOCC. Further,
the District Court failed to recognize that the BOCC was equitably estopped &om
denying KHD's applications by virtue of the Post-Mediation Agreement. Substantial
rights of KHD as a landowner have been prejudiced, and KHD's due process rights have
been violated. KHD respectfully requests that the Supreme Court vacate the decision of
the District Court and remand with instructions that the BOCC approve KHD's Second
PUD and subdivision application, upon the terms and conditions set forth in the Hearing
Examiner's Recommendation of Approval to the first application (ROA, First Appeal,
1655); the terms of the Post-Mediation agreement limiting the issues; and the Planning
Staffs Recommendation of Approval of August 23,2007 (ROA, Second Appeal, 20652301). KHD further requests that this Court award KHD attorney's fees pursuant to
Idaho Code jj 12-117.
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DATED this Pmay

of April 2009.
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